2000-2010: A New Era In A Traditional World  Global De-Synchronization

The fundamental question of the next decade  2000-2010 - for both individual countries and the international system as a whole - will revolve around the United States. The question, increasingly, will be this: How can other countries limit American power and control American behavior?

For the last 500 years, since European imperialism began the process of creating a single, global system of international relations, the international system has maintained a certain predictable rhythm and pattern. During each successive era, at least two and frequently more powers have competed against one another for preeminence.

From the Portuguese and Spaniards in the 16th century to the Americans, Russians and Chinese toward the end of the 20th century, the world arena has seen an unchanging pattern of great power competition. In this competition, all nations eventually became players, prizes or victims. Each competition was global not only in the sense that it covered the entire world, but also in the sense that it involved all arenas of competition: economic, military, political, cultural and ideological. Each epoch came to an end, usually in a cataclysmic war, often with the implosion of one or more of the competitors.

As each epoch ended, a short interregnum occurred in which itappeared that the victorious powers would enjoy permanent, unfettered dominion. From the Congress of Vienna in 1815, to Versailles in 1919 to the United Nations in 1945, it always appeared the end of an epoch would permanently change the underlying pattern of the international system. The victors always harbored the hope that victory would remain permanent and unchallenged, the interests of the victors effortlessly perpetuated. Yet the dream always proved an illusion. Victory was never so absolute as to preclude the emergence of new powers or coalitions of old ones dedicated to limiting the power of the victors or even overthrowing the order they created. Sometimes entirely new competitors emerged. Sometimes the same competition re-emerged. Whatever the particular circumstances, competition among great powers was permanent.
   
The end of the Cold War is no different than the end of any other epoch. The coalition formed by the United States became victorious when the Soviet Union collapsed. The institutions that the anti-Soviet coalition created seemed to have inherited the world. The distinction between NATO, the IMF and the United Nations, for example, seemed to become irrelevant, as all were equally bent to tasks set for them by the United States and its allies. Even more important, the cultural and ideological victory of the anti-Soviet coalition appeared to be absolute. Liberal capitalism became the universally accepted doctrine. Even China's official communism appeared to be irrelevant, as it was swept into the single, integrated system of relationships dominated by American power. Apart from a handful of "rogue" nations like Iraq or Serbia, the world appeared finally at peace, integrating rapidly into a single global system where everyone shared in the benefits of free trade, human rights and prosperity.   

Yet the last ten years did not constitute the end of history. They were simply an interregnum, like so many others before it, in which the victory of a single power or coalition could appear to be so complete that the emergence of a new challenge to that power was unthinkable. America's victory over the Soviet Union was so stunning, unexpected and absolute that it seemed that American values were now global values and that American power was now absolute. However, no set of values is ever global, and no nation's power, no matter how great, is ever absolute.
   
Beneath the surface of the last ten years, the shape of the next epoch has been quietly emerging. Its shape is not yet fully revealed, but can be seen well enough to describe. Most important, the next epoch will look much like the last five hundred years. The details will change, the dynamics will shift, but the essence will remain the same. The game of nations is not over.  

The United States remains at the center of the international system. It is the preeminent global military, economic and political power. Militarily, the U.S. Navy controls the world's oceans more completely than any empire in history. As important, the United States exercises almost complete control of space, enabling its intelligence apparatus to see deep and its military to shoot deep and with precision. Economically, the United States is experiencing an unprecedented boom, surging past all other regions of the world. This military and economic power yields unprecedented political influence. This is complemented by geography. As the only great power native to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, it can influence events globally with an ease that magnifies its inherent power. 

Thus, the fundamental question of the next decade - for both individual countries and the international system as a whole - will revolve around the United States. The question, increasingly, will be this: How can other countries limit American power and control American behavior?
   
There are two processes that will shape the manner in which this question is answered. One is the permanent process whereby the international system seeks equilibrium. The second is a process that we feel will drive the early stages of the next epoch. We call this process the de-synchronization of the international economic system. The former process will drive nations to form coalitions to block the power of the United States. The second process will generate intensifying friction between not only the United States and the anti-American coalition, but between all regions and within regions as well. It points to a decade of increasing political and economic tension - both between great powers and within the spheres of influence created by the great powers.
   
  
The Search for Equilibrium
   
The international system has been in a state of disequilibrium since the fall of the Soviet Union. The unipolar world in which the United States is the only power with global economic, political and military influence, creates certain inevitable responses that tend to move the world toward equilibrium. Less powerful nations see themselves as being placed in a disadvantageous position by American power. Some experience the disadvantage militarily, some politically, some economically. Some experience it across a broad spectrum. None of these nations, by themselves, have the ability to resist the process.
  
This leaves them with three options. The first is to directly resist American power and influence. This is always a dangerous option. By definition, the United States possesses a series of counters to resistance that can devastate any isolated nation, should the United States choose to act. The second option is to seek to accommodate one's own policies to those of the United States. To most nations, this appears the optimal course. It, too, is extremely dangerous. The United States, like any other nation, tries to generate relationships that are advantageous to it. Decisions that are extremely limited and focused, from the American point of view, can have devastating effects on partners. A decision to ban the import of bananas from a small country is a microscopic decision from the American point of view, but has macro-economic consequences of epic proportions for small banana exporters.
   

The very size and scope of American interests creates a situation in which a vast number of microscopic decisions are made which have enormous effects on other nations. The sheer size of American interests creates a management problem in which avoiding devastating outcomes for other nations is impossible - even if this was the American goal, which it is frequently not. Policy makers at the center can't possibly oversee the range of issues being dealt with. The opportunity for interests inside and outside the United States to manipulate the decision-making process at the microscopic level is enormous. While the central thrust of policy is manageable, the micro level is easily manipulated. The result is a seemingly random set of policies that make it impossible for many countries to find a stable, safe standpoint in their relations with the United States.
   

With isolated resistance and accommodation being difficult for many to exercise, the natural result is coalition-building, designed tо constrain the United States. This is not a simple process and doesn't operate in a straight line. As the optimal outcome, most nations want a shift in U.S. policy. It is difficult to even get American attention on most policy issues relevant to weaker nations, let alone to generate sufficient threats to motivate the United States to shift its policies. The virtue of anti-American coalition-building is not that it builds a coalition, but that it increases the probability of attracting American attention and generating sufficient threats to force favorable policy shifts in Washington.
  
   Thus, most countries move into anti-U.S. coalitions less out of a
   desire to confront the United States than out of a desire to reach
   accommodation with it. For example, the Russians and Chinese both
   engaged in anti-American coalition building with each other less
   out of a desire to confront the United States than out of a desire
   to extract concessions. To some extent this process works. But the
   range of demands placed on the United States makes universal, or
   even frequent, accommodation impossible.
  
   Thus, the coalitions that are formed to extract concessions from
   the United States transform themselves over time into fixed
   relationships designed to both resist the United States and create
   alternative systems of relationships to allow nations to function
   insulated from American power. Some of these relationships have
   already formed, particularly on the economic level. Others will
   form over time. They will increasingly create a fragmented global
   system in which American unipolar power confronts a complex of
   opposition coalitions.
  
  
   Global Economic De-Synchronization
  
   The geography of this confrontation will be driven by global
   economic de-synchronization. The fundamental assumption of liberal
   capitalism is that, freed from the constraints of military force
   and domestic tyrannies, the attractiveness of liberal human rights
   doctrines and the tremendous efficiencies of capitalism would draw
   all nations together into a single system in which war and conflict
   would be irrational. The foundation of this theory was that the
   emergence of a single, integrated global economy would erode
   nationalism on every level, including cultural differences. The de-
   nationalized corporation would become more important than national
   institutions. International institutions would supplant national
   institutions in managing what were, after all, international
   issues.
  
   For everyone to accept the primacy of international institutions,
   it was presupposed that everyone would have the same basic
   interests. To be more precise, it was assumed that the decisions of
   the international system would leave no one at a fundamental and
   unrecoverable disadvantage. Given the diversity of the world, this
   seems an unreasonable expectation. Those who believed this to be
   not only possible but inevitable rested their argument on what
   appeared to them as a reasonable assumption: the increased mobility
   of capital across borders would create an integrated global
   economy.
  
   There was another vital assumption behind this vision of a global
   economy. People assumed that the global economy would be, on the
   whole, synchronized. The logic and necessity of the business cycle
   is well understood. Recessions are needed in order to enforce
   efficiencies against businesses whose rates of return on capital
   are below norms. It is also understood that different monetary,
   fiscal and trade policies are mandated by different stages of the
   business cycle. The assumption behind economic globalism was that
   increased international economic integration would also lead to
   increased synchronization among the world's leading economies.
   Japan, the United States and Europe would be synchronized,
   requiring compatible economic policies. Therefore, the
   internationalization of economic policy-making would increase
   rather than decrease economic harmony.
  
   In 1997, the foundations of this theory were falsified. Asia went
   into the worst recession it had seen since the end of World War II.
   It was generally expected that the Asian meltdown would generate a
   global crisis. The exact opposite happened. Asia's meltdown led to
   a massive flow of capital out of Asia and into the United States.
   That, coupled with the general state of the American economy,
   intensified a boom already underway. The world experienced de-
   synchronization as one region sank into depression while another
   region boomed. The very process that was supposed to harmonize the
   global economy into a single business cycle, actually worked to
   intensify the de-synchronization. This de-synchronization violated
   most expectations of the world's conventional observers. It also
   created an extraordinarily dangerous situation that persists today.
  
   As the year 2000 approaches, two overwhelming forces are shaping
   the international system. The first is the process of coalition-
   building in which weaker powers seek to gain leverage against the
   overwhelming power of the United States by joining together in
   loose coalitions with complex motives. The second process, economic
   de-synchronization, erodes the power authority of the international
   organizations used by the United States and its coalition during
   the Cold War and the interregnum. More important, de-sychronization
   creates a generalized friction throughout the world, as the
   economic interests of regions and nations diverge.
  
   The search for geopolitical equilibrium and global de-
   synchronization combine to create an international system that is
   both increasingly restless and resistant to the United States.
   Indeed, de-synchronization decreases the power of the United States
   substantially. During the Cold War and the 1990s, the United States
   could control the behavior of nations with the inducement of
   economic cooperation. As the international system de-synchronizes,
   economic cooperation with the United states becomes not only less
   attractive, but also genuinely harmful to many nations.
  
   For example, economic cooperation with the United States can
   threaten a country like Japan. As the American economy matures
   during this business cycle, there will be a natural tendency to
   raise interest rates. As interest rates rise, capital will flow out
   of Japan to the United States. Japan, badly in need of investment
   capital and at a totally different place in its business cycle,
   will seek to protect itself from U.S. fiscal and monetary policy,
   rather than to participate in it. Economics become a disincentive
   for cooperation rather than an incentive. It follows that if
   economic collaboration becomes less interesting to the Japanese, an
   American lever for political and military cooperation dissolves as
   well.
  
   De-synchronization removes incentives for economic cooperation with
   the United States and reduces the economic penalties for
   resistance. Nations are freed to resist. Indeed, they are given
   added incentive. This will particularly be the case if and when the
   economic cycles shift, as they always do, and the U.S. economy
   becomes weak while others grow strong.
  
  
   Forecasts
  
   Let us consider some particular forecasts that we can make if the
   basic model we are working from is correct.
  
   * De-synchronization will undermine the integrated global economic
   system, replacing it with regional economic groupings. This will be
   particularly visible in Asia and in the former Soviet Union as well
   as Europe. De-synchronization will diverge national interests
   within the regions, leading to intra-regional stress and poaching
   within the regions. Anti-American coalitions will emerge within
   regions and between regions.
  
   * The United States will continue to lead the world economically, in
   spite of the probability of a recession some time in the first half
   of the decade. However, structural problems, including an aging
   population liquidating capital holdings in retirement and severe
   labor shortage indicate serious problems later in the decade.
  
   * Except for a few countries with relatively healthy banking
   systems, Asia will not recover during this decade. Asia's economic
   problems cannot be solved without a wrenching remake of its
   financial system. Lacking the will and political capacity to carry
   this out, most Asian countries, including Japan and China, will
   remain in a long-term stagnation mode. Intermittent upturns will be
   mistaken for recovery, but the basic pattern remains flat to
   negative. The most important issue in the region will be the
   political consequences of this economic deterioration. Both China
   and Japan will experience profound political repercussions from
   their inability to solve underlying economic problems.
  
   * Russia, essentially cut off from Western capital and unable to
   compete in Western markets, will be forced by circumstances to
   regain the components of the former Soviet Union. The general
   inability of the former republics to participate in Western
   economic activities will make the prospect of some form of re-
   federation attractive to many outside of Russia. Nationalism will
   compete with economic reality, creating a complex and dangerous
   situation. Russia will spend most of the next decade in the painful
   process of reconstructing its empire. It will seek to cooperate
   with China to block U.S. interference in the reconstruction
   process.
  
   * Since German reunification in 1989, the fundamental question in
   Europe has been whether Germany will represent a challenge to
   European stability, as Germany did in 1871, 1914 and 1939. The
   basic assumption has been that the existence of the European Union
   has changed the dynamics of German nationalism, by abolishing
   Germany's sense of geopolitical insecurity while creating an
   economic framework too valuable for Germany to abandon. Two tests
   face Europe. The first is whether the European Union's monetary
   union can survive de-synchronization, in which some regions of
   Europe are booming, while others are in recession. The second test
   will be whether the rest of Europe is prepared to join Germany in
   defending the eastern frontiers of Poland in the face of resurgent
   Russian power. We remain pessimistic about the long-term prospects
   of a united Europe.
  
   * We remain optimistic about an Arab-Israeli peace, so long as it is
   understood that this peace will be about as friendly as is normally
   the case in the region. The absence of massive bloodshed is the
   most that can be hoped for. With the long-term decline of oil and
   commodity prices over, a floor has been placed under many Arab
   economies for the first time in a generation. This opens the door
   for the return of a degree of prosperity in some parts of the
   region.
   
* South Africa is returning slowly to its natural role of hegemon in
   southern Africa. No longer limited by Apartheid, South Africa's
   ability to manipulate and guide affairs in sub-Saharan Africa is
   substantial, assuming that it can maintain its internal stability.
   
* Latin America is beginning to experience a division into two
   parts. There are growing signs of instability in the northern tier,
   running from Panama and Ecuador to Venezuela. While the rest of the
   continent remains stable, deterioration of the northern tier can
   spread and destabilize the continent. The central question is
   whether Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez will be able to maintain
   a reformist strategy or whether the process will get away from him
   and turn into revolution. If so, the revival of the left in Latin
   America, colliding with the technocrats who manage ministries and
   governments, could create a volatile political situation.
   
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